
SUBJECT: (Optional)				
Senior Manage	ement Co	onference	e 8-9	November 1987
FROM:			EXTENSION	DATE -87
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S	6 November 1987  COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED	INITIALS	to whom. Draw a fine across column after each comment.)
DDCI				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.			·	
9.				
0.			11-31-	
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				·

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20 : CIA-RDP89B00224R000200660006-7



SECRET

25X1

Monday, 9 November 1987

0800-0900 Discussion led by

TOPIC: CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF RESOURCE CUTS

## **BACKGROUND:**

Major Resource Reductions are Pending:

- DOD Reorganization Act
  - -- DIA Reductions
  - -- Service Officer Reductions
- Potential G-R-H Reductions
  - -- Between 10-20 Percent According to Outlay Profiles
- Freeze Alternative
  - -- 1987 Levels Plus Inflation

## ISSUE:

Is there a class of activity that we would honestly propose to discontinue or drastically reduce?

- Preferably, both expensive and manpower intensive.
- For example, operational ELINT support.

Alternatively, would we realistically still try to meet all requirements with priorities determining degree of coverage?

- What would we need to do to the priorities system to adjust?



Monday, 9 November 1987

25X1

1445-1515 Discussion led by

TOPIC: IMPROVING THE INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS PROCESS

## BACKGROUNU:

This session will address some major issues and lay out directions to pursue in improving the requirements arena. There is heightened interest in approaches involving more than one intelligence discipline (e.g., imagery or signals) to help solve intelligence, and intelligence support, problems. This interest in multidisciplinary approaches will be increased yet further with the advent of additional, new types of collection systems and the accompanying value in developing more sophisticated requirements management and tasking systems. New thinking is occurring to create workable processes that cut across disciplines usefully.

The major issues, to be touched upon and discussed, are:

- o The origins of this desire (or need) to improve.
- o Why requirements is the place to begin.
- o How that leads to the rest of "the problem" (i.e., evaluations).

Examples of the directions which US intelligence should undertake are:

- o Get better contact with senior policy and military officers for the purpose of refining their top-level needs for intelligence help.
- o Create a means to merge, simplify, and watch over these top-level needs.
- o Force the DCI collection committees--and their respective bureaucracies--to think and act together.
- o Conduct aperiodic evaluations of high interest topics.

25X1

SECRET



Monday, 9 November 1987

25X1

1015-1200 Discussion led by

Or. Lawrence Gershwin

and

TOPIC: NFIC Discussion on Intelligence Consequences of Soviet Bloc Changes

Key Issues to be Discussed:

- 1. What factors are propelling changes in the USSR?
  - sense of crisis at home
  - ensure competitive position in 21st century
- 2. What are the major components of Gorbachev's domestic agenda?
  - traditional measures (cadre change, human factor, modernization)
  - "radical" reforms (perestroika -- glasnost; economic reforms)
- 3. Where are these measures taking USSR?
  - considerable uncertainty on this point
  - risks/obstacles to reform are great; uphill battle
  - potential for systemic reform exists and, as long as effort continues, changes in Soviet behavior that are already presenting us new challenges and opportunities
- 4. Impact on foreign policy? What next from Gorbachev?
  - create international environment supportive of reform at nome
  - protect economic modernization program--slow down or stop US SDI, reduce US challenge
  - vigorous foreign policy--alter image of Soviet threat, aggressively pursue arms control on all fronts
  - Should we expect a bold Soviet initiative on conventional weapons? Could or should we preempt this?
- 5. Implications of Gorbachev's agenda for military and defense effort? Are they going to CUT defense spending to fix their economy?
  - massive infusion of resources into economic modernization
  - hold down--if not cut--defense spending
  - reassert party's prerogative in setting national security agenda

- 6. What has been the impact of Gorbachev's agenda so far on military programs? What are the main trends in weapons development?
  - trends in programs better indicator of defense effort than budget
  - high rate of strategic modernization
  - quality-quantity tradeoff

ં 😘 છ

- no real sign yet of major impact
- 7. Where are savings on defense spending possible? What observables should we look for?
  - changes in readiness levels, extent of training, operations
  - reduced production rates, slower modernization, program cancellation
  - arm control initiatives that could ease burden
- 8. Do arms control initiatives reflect changes in military doctrine, missions, and objectives?
  - reform effort driven by desire to make USSR more, not less, competitive
  - "new thinking" appears to reflect more priority for political component of national security
  - robust military establishment no matter what course Soviets take
- 9. Will the Soviets be less competitive militarily in the short term if Gorbachev's agenda succeeds? How about the long term? What if the reform effort fizzles out? Or, fails badly?



	Monday, 9 November 1987
25 <b>X</b> 1	1330-1445 Discussion led by
	TOPIC: INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION
	BACKGROUND:
25 <b>X</b> 1	Arms control issues are a central element of Presidential policy and action. The US and USSR are currently engaged in six negotiations on arms limitations: INF, START, Defense and Space, Chemical Warfare, Nuclear Testing, and MBFR. The Administration has agreed to a Summit beginning 7 December 1987, at which an INF Treaty will be signed. New initiatives and heavy emphasis have been placed on START. Nuclear testing negotiations, preliminary to the ratification of the TTBT and PNET treaties, are newly under way. The Soviets are pushing forward in the CW arena.
25X1	
	One significant element of all these potential agreements is the US requirement for strong verification, including several forms of on-site monitoring and inspection, particularly short-notice challenge inspections. The INF Treaty will provide the Intelligence Community with significant
25X1	challenges. Chief, ACIS, will discuss the monitoring requirements deriving from the agreement. He will describe the potential Intelligence Community structure to deal with on-site inspection for INF. Discussion will then center on collection, processing, and analytical
25 <b>X</b> 1	requirements and impact

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/20 : CIA-RDP89B00224R000200660006-7

25X1

0 00 0